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Outline and objective
Industrial policy has again become a major issue in industrialised countries. We analyse why this has happened and to what extent a 'new' industrial policy should be different from the old, discredited policy, which often tended to decelerate structural change. Academic scholars (Rodrik, 2004A, Aghion et al., 2011 Aiginger, 2007 offer concepts of a 'new' or 'systemic' industrial policy, which should be based on new technologies and support society's long-term targets. This rationale for government intervention goes well beyond the traditional market failure arguments, such as monopolies and is based on international externalities and coordination failures. The U.S. government, the European Commission and the OECD have advocated reindustrialization and industry-oriented 'integrated' policies, since at least the recent financial crisis 1 . The European Commission has initiated WWWforEurope, a
European research program involving 33 European research teams and supporting U.S. economists, to analyse the feasibility of a new path for growth in Europe, based on social and ecological innovation. 2 In the meantime, U.S. industrial policy is lured by the prospect of cheap energy, which it hopes will -together with rising wages in China -reduce its large current account deficit. The U.K., which also has twin deficits in its trade and public budgets, is pondering how to revive its industrial sector. At the same time, the U.K. protects its financial sector, which has been a more powerful job generator than manufacturing in the past two decades. France is undecided whether and how to shelter its remaining industry from globalization, relying either on grand projets, regional innovation centres (core competition) or public-private sector networks, or alternatively fostering employment and new businesses by reducing social charges and corporation tax. Southern Europe has lost a substantial part of its industrial base and is trying to stop its decline in GDP by revitalising exports to global markets, 3 An important question is whether industrial policy and climate policy are partners or adversaries. The European Commission started this discussion by moving 'sustainability'
(together with 'competitiveness') to the 'centre stage' of industrial policy (European Commission, 2010) . Renewable energy was declared one of the 'enabling technologies'. But Europe also envies the U.S.'s cheap, new energy sources and fears that energy-intensive industries in particular will relocate to the U.S. for lower energy prices, or to Asia for lower environmental standards. These arguments limit the 'greening' of Europe's industrial policy. If the second line of arguments wins, Europe will lose the first-mover advantage of becoming a test-bed for clean technologies, which could be exported to other countries in the future, as worldwide environmental ambitions increase.
but forfeiting its change to organise 'industrial zones' encouraging start ups and inward foreign direct investment with different administrative rules.
1 European Commission (2010, 2011, 2012) ; OECD (2012); Veugelers (2013) . 2 See http://www.foreurope.eu/.
We discuss the challenges of a 'low-road' answer to the U.S.'s new competitive advantage of low energy prices, and contrast it to a 'high-road' strategy for competitiveness. This strategy connects industrial policy proper with innovation and climate policy, to generate a new, 'systemic' industrial policy. It supports society's long-term goals and is based on the comparative advantages of industrialised countries. The alternative, a low-road strategy aimed at lower standards and wages, would bring the similar short-term relief for troubled companies as 'old' industrial policy used to do, reducing the long-term dynamics of manufacturing in rich countries.
2.
Re-emerging attention for manufacturing
The hypothesis of rise and fall
The eventual decline of the share of manufacturing in industrialised countries' GDP is well established in economic theory (e.g. as the second phase of the so-called threesector hypothesis, Clark, 1957, and Fourastier, 1954) . It is driven both by demand forces (the preference for services increases with rising income) and by supply forces (technological progress lowers manufacturing cost). This sectorial shift -after a first phase of industrialisation -has been welcomed as a sign of a mature society, because service jobs are less strenuous and subject to less cyclical variation. 4
Renewed interest
It has been argued that this transformation should not happen too soon or too quickly (see the criticism of the U.K.'s premature deindustrialisation in the 1960s), inter alia because the lion's share of technological innovation occurs in manufacturing. Product-cycle theory and trade theory stress that it is a particular feature of the international division of labour that industrialised countries have advantages in the invention and innovation phase, while developing countries have advantages in manufacturing mature products with standardised production. The transfer of parts of the value chain to lower-income countries provides rents for higher-income countries. At the same time, services have changed from personal and government services, to 'production-related' services, the crown jewels being IT-and financial services, which offer dynamic employment and higher wages.
Increasing attention towards the manufacturing sector, and calls to limit or reverse its decline have arisen since 2000 at least for two reasons: firstly, emerging-market countries' inroads into global manufacturing; and secondly, industrialised countries' experience of the impact that bubbles in non-trade related sectors had on the severity and length of the financial crisis.
Competitive pressure from emerging-market countries: industrialised countries are losing market share to emerging-market manufacturers, which are making inroads in ever more sectors, and not only in traditional, labour-intensive ones. China now has the largest industrial sector in absolute terms. Trade deficits of several large industrialised countries have ballooned and can no longer be offset by service exports. This has resulted in large current-account deficits (especially in the U.S., as well as in the U.K., France and Italy).
Experience before and during the financial crisis: economic growth in nonmanufacturing was particularly strong in the run-up to the crisis; bubbles occurred in the construction sector, in property prices and in financial markets, often driven by low interest rates or public support. Evidence has mounted that economic growth is no longer positively affected by the size of the financial sector, as bubbles in finance and construction have destabilised economies (Schneeweiß, 2012 , Cecchetti -Kharroubi, 2012 . Looking for indicators to explain different national performance during the Financial Crisis has shown the current account balance as the most important determinant of the depth of the crisis across countries (Aiginger, 2011B) . 5 Countries with current account deficits at the start of the crisis together with a small manufacturing base endured a particularly long crisis and output is often still lower than in 2007 (see Figure 3) . In Southern Europe 6 , where the share of manufacturing declined to 11% (2012) from 16% (1960), and current account deficits amounted to 13% of GDP before the crisis, GDP is today still more than 10% below its pre-crisis peak. 7
In summary, it is difficult to explain differing national performance during the recent financial crisis with one single factor, but if there is a candidate it is pre crises balance of current account.
Ireland, which also had a severe crisis resulting from bubbles in the construction and finance sectors, recovered more quickly inter alia by boosting exports through its large industrial base. 8 The importance of manufacturing as a basis for growth is well known. This sector conducts the largest share of R&D and many sophisticated services are based on production. 9
5 Robustness checks show that this relation is not dependant on outliers (like Greece at the one end or China at the other end), but still current account balances may signal deeper and more complex problems of an economy which cannot be proxied easily by additional variables.
6 Defined as Greece, Spain and Portugal; unweighted average. 7 In Greece the industrial sector declined to 8% (2011) from 15% (1980) and the current account deficit reached 18% of GDP (2008) . Similar developments occurred in Portugal, Spain and Latvia.
8 Budget deficits and the debt/GDP ratio were far less able to explain country differences during the crisis. There is no easy relationship between the share of manufacturing at current prices in 2007 and the changes in countries GDP thereafter (see Figure 2 ). 9 The decline of manufacturing's share in GDP is higher, if measured in nominal terms (which reflects wages and incomes generated in manufacturing) and in employment, less in volumes. 
2.3
Stylized facts on the share of manufacturing
In the U.S., manufacturing today generates only 12% of GDP, less than half its share in 1960. The financial sector's contribution to GDP is increasing, approaching 10% of value-added and 40% of all corporate profits (Wolf, 2014) . A new argument for the declining manufacturing base in the U.S. is provided by recent MIT studies (Berger, 2013) , namely that although new products' invention phase still starts in the U.S., the offshoring of production to low-cost countries occurs earlier (Berger, 2013) . As a consequence, the learning process from new products in the late innovation and early production phases, is transferred to other countries. This reduces positive spillover effects to other companies and subsequent innovations. Cooperation in the U.S. manufacturing sector is less developed than in Europe. U.S. companies are 'alone at home', instead of being part of a cluster of related companies or embedded in industrial ecosystems.
In Western Europe (EU-15) manufacturing's declining share of GDP, to 14% (2012) from 21% (1960), is less dramatic. 10 Overall, it appears that in the U.S. spending on innovation -and resulting productivity -is high, although this is not used to produce enough goods or services to balance trade. In contrast, Europe has a balanced trade position, with low dynamics and a But Europe is unable to eliminate the gap in per-capita income and labour productivity compared to the U.S. (which is larger in per-capita terms and smaller per hour; see Aiginger -Bärenthaler-Sieber -Vogel, 2013 
Industrial policy: From the bottom to the top of the agenda
We have shown that the renewed interest in manufacturing is based on two economic arguments: (i) emerging-market countries' increasing share of global GDP;
(ii) the evidence from the financial crisis that a decline in the manufacturing sector combined with a current account deficit delayed recovery; we had known before that the manufacturing sector is necessary for research and innovation, which are the main growth drivers in industrialised countries. But this line known -before the financial crisis -has attracted increased attention following evidence from the U.S.
that early offshoring can lead to a loss of learning and skills in frontier technologies.
We may add the political argument that public budgets, which were used to rescue banks and finance unemployment and pensions, were not subsequently directed towards job creation and growth in the real economy. As a result, politicians and policy documents are now unanimously calling for a new industrial policy in countries from the U.S. to the U.K. and France. This section gives an overview first on 'old" industrial policy, and then for calls of academia and economic policy for a new one.
Past policy: diversity and demise
Industrial policy in Europe has been implemented differently over time and across countries. As far as a timeline is concerned, European industrial policy began with the European Coal and Steel Community. For a while thereafter, it remained primarily a national policy with a predominantly sectorial focus (French style, large projects, national champions), this was followed by a period of horizontal competitiveness policies (German style, broad 'measures' that did not discriminate between sectors).
The European Community failed to mention industrial policy at all in the 'Treaty of 11 Thus holds more for per capita productivity than for per hour productivity. Share of manufacturing at current prices I ncrease of production index Rome' and its successor, the EU, mainly followed the horizontal approach. In the 1990s, it looked as if interest in industrial policy was dying in the EU, as well as at national level (Aiginger, 2007 ). An early revival was attempted by defining a 'matrix- knowledge-driven economy. These Scandinavian countries could be the benchmark for a future-oriented industrial and innovation policy, since they managed to achieve a broad selection of economic goals (income, social inclusion, ecological excellence, fiscal prudence) by a high-road strategy.
Academia defining elements of a 'New Industrial Policy'
Academic literature took the lead in defining how in a globalised world a future oriented industrial policy could be different from the past. Many proposals exist, and here we mention only three: Rodrik (2004) first offered the perspective of industrial policy for developing countries, and later a 'manufacturing imperative' (Rodrik, 2011) and recently a blueprint for a 'green industrial policy' (Rodrik, 2013) . Aghion et al.
(2011) present a pro-market approach for an industrial policy in frontier economies. In addition, introduces the concept of a systemic industrial policy, based on the finding that the European countries that fared best during the financial crisis had strategies combining innovation, education and openness.
The following elements seem to be common to these 'new approaches':
• Industrial policy should be a state of mind … create a climate of cooperation between government and the private sector … a discovery process … generate positive spillovers to other sectors and not be based on purely financial incentives … not picking winners (Rodrik, 2011) . It should target activities and broad sectors, never firms; it should promote new activities not prevent exit … follow markets instead of leading them (Aghion et al., 2011) .
• Industrial policy is necessary to prevent 'lock-in' situations, of investing in old technologies. Producers of 'dirty products' tend to innovate in 'dirty programs'. In a nutshell Aghion et al. (2011) argue that new research follows old paradigms and that companies invest where they have been successful in the past. The task of industrial policy is to prevent conservative path-dependent decisions.
• Industrial policy should create new comparative advantages and help developing countries to diversify; it should stimulate exports, not prevent imports.
New industrial policy should favour competition, instead of being an adversary of competition policy. Industrial policy should not protect non-viable domestic firms (a criticism of older industrial policy) ; Aghion et al. (2011) .
• Governments should only intervene where they have a long-term interest (not just short-term goals such as saving jobs in distressed regions or during the depths of a recession); it has to be connected with societal needs. Industrial policy should benefit society as a whole, not just individual companies (Aghion et al., 2011; Rodrik, 2008 Rodrik, , 2011 ).
• Industrial policy should no longer be an isolated policy. It has already merged with innovation policy … it has to build up and be supported by education policy. It has to be systemic, pushed by competition, pulled by 'beyond-GDP' goals ; see also Box 1). Industrial policy should start from the vision of where an economy wants to be in 20 or 30 years in the future, of which factors (income, social goals, ecological sustainability) will define welfare, and of which capabilities will provide competitiveness and growth on a path aligned with these pillars (Aiginger -Bärenthaler-Sieber -Vogel, 2013) .
Mazzucato (2011) A future-oriented industrial policy has to be systemic in the sense that it needs to be derived from society's goals. If the European citizen's welfare function gives a large weighting to rising incomes, more social inclusion (less wage dispersion), a stable financial system and sustainability, then industrial policy has to promote these goals. Innovation should be shifted to social and ecological innovation (a feasible task given the scope of government involvement in R&D). Industrial policy should also make use of forces that promote change and foster higher incomes, e.g. competition, globalisation, education and training. Thus a 'Systemic Industrial Policy' is pulled by a vision and pushed by competition.
The Systemic Industrial and Innovation Policy (SIIP) in a nutshell
There are caveats to all of these calls for industrial policy. 
New Industrial Policy in recent EU documents
The European Commission's new industrial policy developed in phases and through several documents (European Commission, 2005 , 2011A, 2011B, 2012 . assertion that all industries are important and that all parts of the value chain -from resource extraction to after-sales services -are relevant for competitiveness. In addition, the threat that energy-intensive industries could relocate to regions with 13 For an overview see Aiginger -Sieber (2006) and Peneder (2009 Peneder ( , 2010 Given the reasons for the declining share of manufacturing (higher productivity, lower relative price increases as well as a lower income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods compared to services), this goal is unlikely to be achieved, without a dramatic change in the general economic growth path. If Europe wishes to improve the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector in the traditional sense, it must raise productivity or lower costs, actions which are both likely to lead to declining shares of industrial goods produced for the home market (see Peneder, 2014 
OECD's call for a 'soft industrial policy'
The OECD, formerly the fiercest critic of the old industrial policy, views clean technologies as essential elements of the 'soft industrial policy' strategy (OECD, 2012 highlighting the principal reasons for the decline of U.S. manufacturing, as being the lack of cooperation across U.S. companies and the loss of learning capacity due to early offshoring, see Berger (2013) . The hope to base the 'renaissance' on cheap energy prices and its impact on the structure of U.S. manufacturing is analysed in section 5.
S: Eurostat (AMECO).
18 Notice that these popular examples are related to qualified labour in the U.S. or to wage increases in China, not to energy prices. 
Europe -a success story in need of a vision and benchmarks
A successful experiment in a midlife crisis
Much analysis of Europe's low dynamics over the past decade forgets that the European Union has been a tremendously successful integration experiment. It started with only 6 members 50 years ago. It now has 28 members with 10 more countries applying for membership or neighbourhood contracts. Europe has integrated former communist countries at such a high speed that the World Bank labelled it an 'integration machine' (World Bank, 2012) . A once divided and fractured continent is now united as a peaceful region (rewarded with the Nobel Prize). Europe is lauded for its 'soft' foreign policy and for spreading the rule of law (Sachs, 2008) .
The current EU-28 is the largest economic region in the world, as measured by Gross National Product. Its share of world trade is more stable than the U.S.'s, albeit falling slightly due to the impact of the newly-industrialised countries. Europe takes the lead in pushing for environmental goals (Kyoto protocol, EU-2020 energy goals) and has promoted a system of carbon emissions trading. 19
Low dynamics and conventional remedies
Europe has lower shares of poverty and less income inequality than other economic areas.
Nevertheless there are also indications of weaknesses. Economic output in the Eurozone in 2014 is still lower than it was in 2008. 20 Lower dynamics
Europe has a double-digit unemployment rate, its banks are undercapitalised and its member states pay higher interest rates for their sovereign debt (despite lower debt/GDP ratios) than the U.S.
and Japan. There are internal trade disequilibria with large surpluses in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, deficits in some big countries (U.K., France) and in Southern Europe (the deficits in the latter region are now declining, in part due to reduced imports). Europe will miss its employment, R&D and poverty reduction goals set out in the Europe 2020 strategy (and adapted by national policy decisions). It will not reach its goals for energy efficiency and curbing CO2 by 2020, and it will grossly miss the trajectories of the energy roadmap to 2050.
21
Five rather conventional policies are needed to revive Europe's dynamics (Aiginger, 2014; Aiginger -Glocker, 2014) ;(i) reducing the disequilibria by joint responsibility and large disequilibria are partly a consequence of the problem that the European institutions (which were adequate for a small number of countries and an integration process limited to trade) are no longer adequate for 28 countries, the majority of which also share a common currency.
22 19 The system broke down since too many energy-intensive sectors were exempted, and other energyintensive companies were able to buy extremely cheap permits from ailing eastern European companies or from companies severely hit by the financial crisis.
of the debtor and the creditor countries; (ii) increasing domestic demand either by boosting consumption via higher wages or less income inequality, or, in a climate of reduced uncertainty, by encouraging companies to reinvest their profits; (iii) 20 In contrast to the U.S. where it is 9% higher; world output exceeds its pre-crisis level by 20% compared to 2008. 21 Of employment, GDP and productivity.
22 See Aiginger et al. (2012) .
restructuring government expenditure and taxes so that they become more growthfriendly; (iv) boosting investment in education, retraining, innovation, and young people; and (v) making use of higher market growth -albeit also higher volatility -in the neighbourhood for exports and investment, including the Black Sea region, Russia and North Africa.
Towards a new growth path: four game changing proposals
However, changes need to go further. Europe must develop its existing socioeconomic model into a role model for a dynamic, inclusive and ecological society in a globalising world. 23 The European Commission -reacting to this need for a new and far-reaching strategy -tendered a large socio-economic research program ('WWWforEurope') to develop a new growth path that, on the one hand, extends the goals of Europe 2020 into the future and on the other targets a much deeper socio-ecological transition.
Social expenditures and ecological ambitions should be turned from costs into drivers of new dynamics (e.g. through an activating labour market policy or an innovation-based sustainability strategy). A new European model could be attractive for young people, as well as for countries climbing up the income ladder, which are looking for alternatives to the Chinese catch-up model or the U.S.
frontier model based on individualism, with low priority for social goals and sustainability.
24
Game changer 1: From GDP to beyond-GDP
Tentative results indicate that several important changes have to be made, if Europe wishes to develop its socio-economic model into a compelling vision. We start by noting some of the overarching changes needed, then discuss some 'barriers' to change.
Economists always understood that GDP is not a welfare indicator − both for technical reasons and for the concept. GDP and its growth nevertheless dominate the discussion of economic policy and are seen as the single overarching measure of success of an economy or region. The criticism of this indicator and its alternatives were summarised by the so-called Stiglitz -Sen -Fitoussi Commission, leading to the 'beyond-GDP goals' (Stiglitz et al., 2009) . These are now widely accepted as a superior theoretical approach. The OECD has published a corresponding set of 'Better
Life Indicators', which many countries now start to use as measure of performance.
Income per capita and income growth will remain important goals particularly for low-income individuals, regions and countries. Other goals receive greater priority, as the marginal utility of income declines. This does not preclude GDP dynamics from remaining an instrument for reaching other ultimate goals, such as full employment, social security, health, consumer choice and so on -the key point is that we should measure the achievement of the ultimate goals, not of the instruments used to reach them.
For a new European growth path and industrial policy, this change from GDP to beyond-GDP is particularly important. The industrial sector is one of the largest production sectors and is responsible for the lion's share of research and development. If the innovations developed in manufacturing do not help attain welfare (as defined by the beyond-GDP goals) the potential of the economic system is not fully utilised. Industrial policy should enforce and accelerate manufacturing's welfare orientation, should support also non-technical innovation and it should be systemic and forward-looking.
Game changer 2: Redefining competitiveness
The term competitiveness has been used over and over again in the narrow sense of cost competitiveness, calling for lower wages and other production costs as policy instruments to 'stay' competitive or 'regain' competitiveness. In its enlightened version productivity is acknowledged as a second element of cost competitiveness, leading to unit cost approaches. The cost focus has been criticised for a long time, spawning approaches that emphasise technological or qualitative competitiveness, and measuring 'outcome competitiveness' using a combination of targets (e.g. income, employment). 25
Game changer 3: Distinguishing between a low road and a high road
Finally, competitiveness should be based on capabilities like skills, innovation, institutions, an empowering social system and ecological ambitions.
Outcomes should be defined by the achievement of broad, socio-economic goals.
Aiginger -Bärenthaler-Sieber -Vogel (2013) therefore propose defining competitiveness as the 'ability to deliver beyond-GDP goals'. This definition could end the preoccupation of economic policy with costs instead of capabilities.
In principle, countries have two ways to close current account deficits, to increase dynamics of the economy or to reduce unemployment. One is to lower costs (wages, taxes, energy prices); the other is to raise productivity, by boosting capabilities (education, innovation), and by becoming a leader in energy efficiency and renewable energy. 26
Game changer 4: Industrial policy as a strategy for high-road competitiveness
We label the first path to regain competitiveness a 'low-road strategy' and the second a 'high-road strategy'. It is difficult for countries with high wages to increase per-capita GDP by reducing wages, because low-income countries have greater competitive advantages in this aspect. Industrialised countries can more successfully compete on quality, innovation and new services (see Aiginger, 1997) . without an agreement on a common definition. We propose to define industrial policy as economic policy to promote the competitiveness of a country or region, 26 We could label this as a multiple equilibrium point of view. 27 For an overview, see Aiginger (2007 where competitiveness is defined as the ability to deliver the beyond-GDP goals. 28 This definition should end (or at least mitigate) the conflict between industrial policy favouring on the one hand specific sectors, and on the other hand activities with positive external effects like innovation and education. It should also mitigate the conflict between industrial policy calling for low energy prices and environmental policy aimed at significantly reducing carbon emissions. Society's ultimate goals determine the direction in which it should move and the weighting of these goals will differ according to income levels, preferences and cultural attitudes. These ultimate goals should set the direction of policy interventions and the instruments of industrial policy.
For industrialised countries with high per-capita incomes, industrial policy should therefore explicitly be a high-road strategy of competitiveness based on capabilities, good institutions and high ambitions for social and ecological behaviour. For Europe and its vision of a socio-economic system with a strong emphasis on inclusion and sustainability, this high-road strategy explicitly includes equality and green goals.
Status quo bias and political rebound effects
We have defined four game changing proposals that are far from easy to implement: (i) a new yardstick for performance; (ii) a new definition of competitiveness; (iii) the choice between a low and a high road to competitiveness (suggesting that welfare increases in industrialised countries require a high-road strategy); and (iv) a broader industrial policy encompassing goals that were considered beyond its ambit until now. We have to expect hurdles on this path. Some resistance comes from the traditional inefficiency of governments in reaching their goals, some from the fact that voters tend to vote for their short-term interests, often influenced by lobbying groups that benefit from the status quo. Discussion of these hurdles is part of WWWforEurope's remit and can be found on http://www.foreurope.eu/ (Aiginger, 2013; Arrow, 2013; Aiginger, 2014 , Geels, 2013 .
In the next section we will highlight some barriers and political 'rebound effects" 29
In general, government and old industrial policy tend to support the status quo.
Political rebound effects usually set in once transition has started and some lowhanging fruit has been harvested. at the interface of industrial and energy policy. As political rebound effects we label successful lobbying by defenders of the status quo, after there had initially been strong political support for change.
Interface of industrial and energy policy: Progress and barriers
The new consensus
The need for and the success of a new industrial policy, which promotes 'high-road' competitiveness in industrial countries and explicitly takes societal goals into account, 28 Of related interest, see Peneder (2014) . 29 Political rebound effects mean successful lobbying by defenders of the status quo, after there had initially been strong political support for change.
can be illustrated through the measures taken for reaching climate goals and the industrial sector's contribution to this path.
Global warming and the need to limit temperature change to a 2C increase (relative to the preindustrial age) until 2100 are now well understood. This holds also for the contribution of human activities and the extent to which greenhouse gases have to be curbed (Stern, 2007 , IPCC, 2014 . Europe has established a roadmap, according to which emissions should be reduced between 80% and 95% by 2050. 30 There are encouraging signs that energy policy is on a new path:
Signs of change
• The EU-27's greenhouse gas emissions for 2010 are 10% below their 1990-levels.
• Material consumption was 14% lower in 2000 than in 1970, and further declined by 13% between 2000 (Fischer-Kowalski -Hausknost, 2014 . 31
• Nearly all industrialised countries show signs of relative decoupling, insofar as energy consumption (and in particular fossil energy use) is increasing at a lower rate than GDP.
• Denmark succeeded in achieving an absolute decoupling of its energy consumption: while GDP more than doubled between 1970 and 2010, fossil fuel consumption decreased by 23%.
• The share of energy derived from renewables is increasing. In Portugal, Sweden and Austria 50% or more of electricity comes from renewable sources.
Resistance to change
There are also backlashes and rebound effects:
• The European CO2 emission trading system collapsed and there is little political will to re-establish it -let alone to deepen its ambitions. The new Australian government abolished its CO2 tax (in contrast, China introduced such a tax in seven cities).
• In energy policy, the focus is shifting backwards, away from supporting energy efficiency and renewable energy, and towards the old strategy of emphasising 30 Simulations by the PRIMES energy system model show that this very ambitious target is in principle feasible without reducing economic growth, although this would require radical technological innovations (energy efficiency improvement greatly above the historical trends) and de-carbonization initiated by a carbon price of 250 €/t (European Commission, 2011; Kupers, 2012; Schleicher − Köppl, 2013) . 31 For differences in decoupling between production and consumption, see Munoz -Steininger (2010) . Thanks to Angela Köppl for this reference.
'affordable' prices and security of supply. Germany's Energiewende -the plan to phase-out nuclear energy -is under pressure and has already been softened in a new coalition agreement. In Europe coal use has increased after the collapse of CO2 emission trading, as it has become cheaper than gas. It is also used to complement renewable energy at times of low supply. Nuclear energy is also returning via the so-called 'neutrality approach'; the U.K. has openly requested new subsidies, based on the argument that without subsidies nuclear energy is too expensive without such subsidies.
5.4
Low energy prices in the U.S.
The availability of new energy sources, especially liquefied gas and gas extracted via new technologies such as fracking, has caused U.S. energy prices to plummet; this is regarded as a chance to revitalise U.S. manufacturing. 32 
Two strategic answers
In principle European industrial policy has two options to answering the challenge of lower U.S. energy costs: the first, to try and lower its own energy costs; and the second to boost energy efficiency so as to limit the cost difference, plus providing additional measures to improve high road competitiveness, if improvements in energy efficiency 32 Focussing on cheap energy as main characteristic of the new industrial policy in the U.S. may not tell the whole story since there are also several innovation and technology initiatives. 
Box 2: Carbon leakage
Carbon leakage addresses the problem that ambitious standards and emission taxes in one country may shift the production of resource intensive products to countries with lower standards, thus raising worldwide greenhouse gases. This argument is used to oppose higher energy prices or standards in Europe.
The carbon leakage argument is not completely wrong in the short-run, but not convincing in the long-run. Actual shifts in production depend on broader strategies, innovation efforts; spill over effects and policy measures.
• If a company is forced to reduce emissions due to higher prices, it may introduce a better technology, not only in respect to energy but also labour or capital efficiency. This 'innovation effect' may exceed the 'relocation effect'.
• Emission trading can provide an 'efficiency discount' to the three most efficient companies (e.g. half price per ton emitted). Then innovating companies receive a double dividend from innovation: first lower costs from the advanced technology and secondly a lower price for the remaining emissions. Furthermore, research funds like those in the EU framework program could promote technologies radically reducing emissions. A program to develop an ultra-low carbon technology in steel production exists, the technology has been developed, a site for a test factory still needs to be built.
• Carbon leakage could be reduced if companies are urged to deploy the 'best technology' to plants in countries with lower standards. Incentives range from moral suasion or stakeholder activism, and to trade or investment agreements. A minimum requirement would be that multinational firms have to report plantspecific emissions.
• A tax or import duty could be levied on the difference between minimal and actual emissions. Such 'border adjustment schemes" should however be treated carefully, as duties reduce trade, are open to protectionist misuse and may provoke counter-measures. 'Climate funds' accelerating the global diffusion of the best technology, financed by emission trading or by a financial transaction tax are a better alternative.
The carbon leakage argument stresses the short run decision where to locate a new plant at a given point of time; it is less convincing for relocations if plants already exist. And worldwide emissions in the longer run depend firstly on technological progress in frontier countries and secondly on the speed of the global diffusion of clean technologies. Higher prices and standards in frontier countries will shift the frontier of efficiency, and trade and investment policy, political, moral and legal pressure and technology transfer funds will decide about the speed of diffusion of best technology. Recall that total subsidies for fossil fuels are estimated to equal 400 billion Euros, 1 and could be used to boost technology transfer.
Summing up, a strategy to slow technological progress via cheaper energy and emissions prices in the countries at the frontier will probably increase worldwide emissions in the long-run. 2 A green industrial policy will dynamically push all countries up the environmental quality ladder.
Summary: A systemic policy, aligned with beyond-GDP goals
(1) Industrial policy is back on the political agenda, driven by fear (globalisation, deindustrialisation) and hope (increasing employment, sustainability). Bubbles in nonmanufacturing sectors (finance, construction, housing) have fuelled the financial crisis, and recovery is especially difficult in countries with a small manufacturing sector, particularly when it is combined with a current account deficit.
(2) Academia suggests that a new industrial policy must be different from the past. It should promote competition and be a discovery process in a cooperative climate between government and companies. It should align industrial policy with the longterm interests of the society. It has to be systemic and driven by a wider vision, instead of a standalone policy in conflict with other strands of government policy. It should stop extending the life of non-viable industries or artificially creating national champions requiring shelter from global competitors.
(3) A new industrial policy requires three new yardsticks and a redefinition of industrial policy.
• First, economic performance should be measured by a broader set of goals or a more comprehensive indicator, instead of GDP (or GDP growth). This could be the 'beyond-GDP goals' or some overall indicator of wellbeing like life satisfaction, happiness or life expectation.
• Second, it should downgrade or abandon the concept of price competitiveness, which emphasises low costs (or in its enlightened version low unit labour costs). Competitiveness should be defined as 'ability to achieve beyond-GDP goals'.
• Third, in trying to increase welfare (beyond-GDP goals) countries may pursue a low-road strategy (emphasising low costs, taxes, social and ecological standards) or a high-road strategy based on research, skills, ecological ambition, an empowering employment policy and excellent institutions.
Industrialised countries have to pursue a high-road strategy, if they want to maintain their frontier position.
• Industrial policy for high-income countries should be defined as the sum of policy measures to achieve 'high-road competitiveness'. By targeting highroad competitiveness and achieving society's wider aims (including social and ecological goals), industrial policy thus merges into a systemic socioeconomic strategy.
(4) Policy documents developed by international organisations, by the European Commission, and national governments have defined new goals for industrial policy that partially follow the ideas of academia. All proposals directly or indirectly focus on the structure of the economies as a whole, not only on a narrowly defined manufacturing sector since the borders between manufacturing and services are ever more blurred. The OECD's 'New Perspectives Program' promotes the inclusion of social and ecological goals into economic models and thinking.
(5) The European Commission puts sustainability 'at the centre stage' of industrial policy (unfortunately jointly with a rather conventional defined competitiveness). Its Energy Roadmap 2050 sets the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by as much as '80 to 95%'. Radical innovation projects -e.g. on ultra-low carbon steel -have been started. Recently, the European Commission set a goal to increase manufacturing's share of nominal value-added GDP to 20% by 2020 (from 16% currently) which is realistic only if quality of production is significantly upgraded and service components are added.
(6) The renewed interest in industrial policy in the U.S. was motivated by the current account deficit. Reducing energy imports and becoming a net exporter for energy seem to be the overarching policy priorities. But a large share of the U.S. deficit -180 billion euro -stems from an U.S. trade deficit in technology-driven industries (where energy costs are about 1% of total costs). Reducing energy prices will not boost the U.S.'s share of manufacturing in global trade, as keeping the median wage constant for 50 years did not help. It has set goals to increase R&D investment to 2% of GDP (the current EU share) and makes advances in electric vehicles and alternative energies.
(8) Europe has in principle two choices to cope with high energy prices: to go for lower energy prices itself (by exploiting shale gas or by reducing taxes on energy) or to further its lead in energy efficiency plus to increase investment in innovation and top education. Given a vision of a system encompassing social and ecological goals, the only viable choice is to pursue an industrial policy to encourage energy efficiency, social and ecological innovation.
(9) Going for a socio-ecological transition can make Europe a 'role model' for other countries, even if different preferences and circumstances will always call for some heterogeneity. Industrial policy should foster the long-run transition, not decelerate structural change. This is a demanding challenge, given vested interests and the traditional role of governments to preserve the status quo and national champions.
(10) Refocusing on the economy's industrial base makes sense, particularly after the experience of bubbles in financial and real-estate markets. New industrial policy should support the transition of traditional narrowly defined manufacturing to a sector producing greater consumer value, supporting the economy's long-term goals. We therefore define an industrial policy for high-wage countries as strategy to promote high-road competitiveness where competitiveness is defined as the ability of an economy to provide 'beyond-GDP goals'.
